

8 May 1967


MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Training

SUBJECT : The IG Report on the CT Program

1. General Comments.

The Intelligence School response to those portions of the IG report that relate to the CT courses given by the School is made extremely difficult by the fact that apparently there has been a complete failure in communicating to the IG survey team what we are trying to do and why we are trying to do it. Naturally, we welcome an evaluation of our training objectives and training methods at any time; such evaluation supplements our own continuing self-evaluation. Also, we appreciate the value of the non-professional point of view, the point of view of those who are not professional educators or trainers and thus are innocent of the sins of traditionalism and the vices of vested interest. We feel, however, that unless such an evaluation begins with an understanding of what the objectives are -- be they the right ones or the wrong ones -- and what methods -- be they good ones or bad ones -- are used to achieve those objectives, there can be no meaningful dialogue about the conclusions of the evaluation.

There seems to have been no such understanding achieved. The IG report confuses objectives with factors that are actually either methods or incidental benefits. For example, the report states that the objective of the Intelligence Techniques Course is "to provide instruction and practice in the techniques used by the Directorate of Intelligence..." This, definitely, is not the objective of the course; it is simply a device necessary in the problem-solving method used in the course to give the students a basic understanding of the problems, methods, and products of the intelligence producing elements of the Agency. A considerable number of similar examples of misconception could be cited but would serve no good purpose.



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Because of this lack of a common point of departure, we find ourselves unable to relate many of the report's comments and opinions to reality. We find ourselves baffled by the suggestion that at least three additional lecture areas be added to the two-week Orientation to Intelligence Course followed by the suggestion that the course be reduced to one week -- a contradiction made possible only by a complete lack of understanding of the real objectives of the course. We also find ourselves baffled by the repeated reference to "duplication" in the courses when, in fact, there is no duplication; there is, of course, re-coverage of areas and activities from different points of view and for different objectives, but such re-coverage is necessary, carefully planned, and carefully coordinated. This, too, reflects a total lack of understanding of objectives.

We in the Intelligence School have discussed this failure to communicate, and we have concluded that the fault is not entirely ours. We have made a careful review of the first-hand contact that the members of the IG team had with Intelligence School personnel and with CT courses given by the Intelligence School, and we have found that actually we had relatively little opportunity to communicate.

25X1A	No member of the IG team interviewed me at any time during the inspection; in October of 1966 [REDACTED] called me on the phone, described his mission briefly, and said that the members of the IG team would be talking with some of the people in the School. [REDACTED]	25X1A
25X1A	and [REDACTED] spent half an hour with [REDACTED] and did not talk with any other OBF instructor; a kit of materials used in the Orientation to Intelligence Course was prepared for them, but they never returned to pick it up; [REDACTED] audited the two-week CT Orientation course for only a part of the last afternoon of the course; [REDACTED] spent between three and four hours with [REDACTED] during the period of the inspection; they did not at any time interview [REDACTED], Chief Instructor of the Intelligence Techniques Course, or [REDACTED], Chief Instructor of the Intelligence Production Course; [REDACTED] audited 20 minutes of the three-week ITC; [REDACTED] audited one hour of the ITC; [REDACTED] audited approximately one and one half hours of the nine-week IPC; [REDACTED] audited no part of the IPC. The third member of the team had no contact whatever with the Intelligence School.	25X1A 25X1A 25X1A 25X1A 25X1A 25X1A

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We understand, of course, that the IG team was working against the pressure of deadlines, and we know that our part in the total CT Program is relatively small; but we feel that fuller coverage of our activity might have avoided the gaps in understanding.

All of this leads us to the conclusion that a point-by-point, line-by-line response to the IG report would involve lengthy restatements of rationale and objectives and some recounting of the ten-year period of development of the courses. Therefore we have concluded that our only feasible approach to the problem is a response directed to those specific recommendations of the report that are related to CT training given by the Intelligence School.

2. Comment on the Recommendations.

No. 17, p. 62 We believe that this recommendation has no merit, and we disagree strongly with most of the premises on which the recommendation is based. We suggest, however, that if this recommendation is implemented, the representatives of the various Directorates be selected on the basis of their experience with, and understanding of, the problems of planning and conducting educational and training programs.

No. 19, p. 66 We raise no objection to the meeting recommended. We feel, however, that such a meeting would be a weak substitute for the close review of objectives and doctrine that is continually carried on by the Intelligence Production Faculty with operating officials in the Directorates concerned. We feel also that over a ten-year period of trial-and-error, experimentation, and revision -- always working closely with representatives of the DDI and the DDS&T -- we have pretty well established that a nine-week period is the shortest one that will permit us to accomplish our objectives.

No. 21, p. 70 We raise no objection to this recommendation, but we feel that the desired end can be achieved without a DDS mandate.

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No. 27, p. 87 We disagree very strongly with that part of this recommendation that would affect the first 13 weeks of the CT training cycle and the length of the nine-week Intelligence Production Course. We cannot accept the validity of the premises, and consequently the conclusions, on which that part of the recommendation is based. We are convinced that cutting the two-week Orientation to Intelligence Course to one week would defeat the purpose of the course; that three weeks of Intelligence Techniques is essential to give to the CT's a basic understanding of the problems, methods, and products of intelligence production; that three or four weeks of training in Worldwide Communism is essential for all CT's; and that the four weeks of Operations Familiarization is essential in giving the DDI and DDS&T CT's a basic understanding of the responsibilities and functions of the Clandestine Services. We have already commented on the Intelligence Production Course. Apparently this recommendation (No. 27) assumes that the concept articulated in the first paragraph on p. 57 of the IG report -- the adoption of one all-purpose familiarization course which would reduce the present headquarters nine-week general training period to six weeks -- will be accepted and would be embodied in the implementation of recommendation No. 17 (p. 62). As we have said, we feel that recommendation No. 17 has no merit, and we have grave doubts about the validity of the "all-purpose" concept and about the practicability of its implementation.

No. 29, p. 92 We raise no objection to this recommendation, but we feel that its implementation would serve no good purpose. (This recommendation was discussed at some length and rejected when it appeared in the [REDACTED] report.)

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No. 30a, p. 93 We feel that this recommendation should be qualified to exempt officers who have had several years of teaching experience.

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[REDACTED]
Chief, Intelligence School

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